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ARBITRATION OF GRIEVANCE AND SALARY
DISPUTES IN PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL:
EVOLUTION OF A SYSTEM OF
PRIVATE LAW
Labor arbitration is a substitute for economic force.' The labor
arbitrator is selected by the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement to administer their private system of self-government,
2
and his decisions can vitalize the employment relationship. Too
many unforeseeable problems exist in such a relationship to make
the words of a contract the exclusive source of obligations. 3 As the
Supreme Court has recognized,
[a]rbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by mold-
ing a system of private law for all the problems which may arise
and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally
accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The
processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actu-
ally a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the
collective bargaining agreement.
4
The provisions for labor arbitration which now exist in the
Basic Agreement between the twelve teams composing the Na-
I United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960); Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 ARB. J. (n.s.) 13, 14 (1965).
2 Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 1245 (1963);
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 1016 (1955).
In the words of Shulman:
A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public
tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are
obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a community
which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of self-government
created by and confined to the parties. He serves their pleasure only, to administer
the rule of law established by their collective agreement. They are entitled to
demand that, at least on balance, his performance be satisfactory to them, and they
can readily dispense with him if it is not.
Id. at 1016.
3 Cox, Riflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1498-99 (1959). Cox
argues that a collective bargaining agreement cannot include all of the rules which may
govern an employment relationship without becoming unwieldy. Therefore, he explains, a
common law of the shop evolves in an industrial community, and this unwritten code of
behavior must be considered in interpreting and applying the terms of a collective bargain-
ing agreement.
4 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960). The decision rendered in Warrior & Gulf was one of three landmark decisions issued
by the Supreme Court on June 20, 1960, on the matter of labor arbitration. The other cases
composing the "Steelworkers Trilogy" were United Steelworkers of America v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). With these three rulings, the Court elevated labor
arbitration and the role of the arbitrator to an unprecedented status.
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tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs, the twelve teams
composing The American League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
and the Major League Baseball Players Association, 5 demonstrate
that the employment relationship between club owners and
baseball players has matured. It has taken many years for unionism
to develop firm roots in the field of professional sports, but the
Major League Baseball Players Association, organized in 1954, has
proven its effectiveness in meeting the needs of its members.
Through collective bargaining, the players have realized economic
benefits in the form of a pension plan, a minimum salary level, life
and disability insurance, and increased expense allowances.6 But
perhaps the most significant modification in the employment rela-
tionship that has been a direct result of collective bargaining
involves freedom, in addition to financial gains. Major league
baseball players now have greater freedom from the unilateral
imposition of discipline to the extent that arbitration has replaced
the power of the baseball commissioner to resolve all grievance
disputes. Moreover, major league baseball players are, for the first
time, at liberty to submit their salary disputes to arbitration. Al-
though baseball is exempt from the antitrust laws, 7 a measure of
freedom has been introduced into the parties' system of self-
government by the implementation of grievance and salary arbitra-
tion. This Note will trace the maturation of labor relations in
professional baseball and will attempt to assess the protection
which labor arbitration offers to the interests of the players, the
club owners, and the fans of professional sports.
5 1973-1975 Basic Agreement Between The American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs and The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League Baseball
Players Assodation, art. V(D.), Salary Arbitration, and art. X, Grievances Procedure [here-
inafter cited as Basic Agreement). See also Memorandum Re Administration of Salary
Arbitration Procedure, on file at the Cornel Law Review.
6 Personal interview with John J. Gaherin, Player Relations Committee, Major Leagues
of Professional Baseball Clubs, in New York City, Jan. 31, 1975 [hereinafter cited as
Interview with J. Gaherin].
7 In Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), the Supreme Court upheld the longstanding
exemption of professional baseball from the antitrust laws. In reviewing Federal Baseball
Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), and Toolson v.
New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), the Supreme Court stated that the exemption
of professional baseball from the antitrust laws was an established aberration. It was an
aberration because other professional sports had been held subject to the antitrust laws.
However, the Court refused to subject professional baseball to antitrust regulation, reason-
ing that Congress had acquiesced in baseball's status (see note 21 infra) and that the
exemption was entitled to the benefit of stare decisis. Thus, the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of baseball's reserve system, which indefinitely binds a player to the dub that
originally signs him until he retires or his contract is assigned. If a player's contract is
assigned to another club, the assignee gains all the reservation rights.
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SURVEY OF THE HISTORY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
Unionism and collective bargaining are not new to profes-
sional baseball. They have sprung up in the past as expressions of
player dissatisfaction, but only to live for ephemeral periods.
Baseball's first "union" was organized in 1885 by Billy Voltz, a
sports editor and minor league manager.8 Known as the National
Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players, it was originally a
benevolent and protective association, consisting of approximately
200 players who paid monthly assessments of five dollars to aid sick
and needy members and to provide for death benefits. During the
first year of its existence the Brotherhood remained a secret
organization, and did not attempt to engage in collective bargain-
ing until 1886, when the National League adopted a rule setting
$2,000 as a maximum salary, although under-the-table deals for
additional money were frequently made.9 In 1887, the Brother-
hood recognized the reserve rule as part of the players' contracts,' °
but was unable to prevent owners from abusing the rule through
blacklisting. 1  The following year, when salary grievances
mounted, the players rejected calling a strike and instead at-
tempted to form their own Players' League.' 2 By 1890, the Brother-
hood no longer existed.
8 P. GREGORY, THE BASEBALL PLAYER 182 (1956). The leader of the "union" was John
Montgomery "Ward, who pitched for the Providence Grays in 1878, and paid his way
through law school with his earnings from baseball.
9 Id. at 182, 184.
10 I& at 183.
Early in the history of baseball, players were able to jump from one team to another at
will. To limit player desertions, a group of National League officials held a secret meeting in
Buffalo on September 30, 1879, to formulate and adopt the reserve rule. As adopted at that
meeting, the reserve rule allowed each club to protect five players for the year 1880 from
raiding by other teams. It was also hoped that the reserve rule would hold down salaries by
preventing reserved players from accepting better offers. In 1883, the number of players
reserved by each club was increased from five to eleven. In 1887, the number was increased
to 14, and soon thereafter the reserve rule, as recognized by the Brotherhood, included all
players under contract. Id. at 150-51. For further discussion of the reserve clause, see
references cited in note 21 infra.
11 Owners commonly suspended players with whom they had disputes. Drunken-
ness, absence, and insubordination were the reasons generally given, but frequently
players were suspended for lesser offenses, sometimes for arguing over salary.
Because the suspended man was reserved, he could not be bired by other clubs.
Id. at 151.
12 "This was an era in which the ideal of workers' cooperatives was popular; for
example, during its first fifty years the New York Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra was a




The League Players' Protective Association was organized in
1900 and vanished by 1903. When the Protective Association came
into existence there was only one authorized baseball league, the
National League. A struggle was underway, however, as the outlaw
American League sought recognition from the commissioner of
baseball. The National League granted concessions to the Associa-
tion in 1901 in exchange for a promise that its members would
honor their contracts and not jump to the outlaw league; but the
Association was unable to prevent its members from jumping to
the higher-paying American League. Once the American League
was officially recognized, the Protective Association was ignored by
the players and disappeared soon thereafter.' 3
Ten years later, in 1912, the Baseball Players' Fraternity was
organized.14 As one writer has remarked:
The owners at first paid little attention to the Fraternity, just
as they had at first ignored the Brotherhood and the Protective
Association, but, as in the two earlier cases, the existence of a
new outlaw, the Federal League, forced them to reckon with the
union in 1914. During the Federal League War the two major
leagues recognized the Fraternity in the hope that this would
make players respect the reserve clause in their contracts and
ignore the high salaries supposedly offered by the outlaw. But
this strategy proved as futile as it had in 1901 when the National
League belatedly made concessions to the Protective Association
in order to stave off the recruitment of the American League.
Failing to prevent its members from violating the reserve clause,
the Fraternity was forced to claim neutrality in the baseball war.
However, it successfully agitated for certain reforms.15
When the Federal League died in 1915, the Fraternity began to
lose its following among the players and its life was terminated in
1918 following an unsuccessful strike.16
Baseball's fourth union was born in 1946 when the American
Baseball Guild was registered as an independent labor organization
by Robert Murphy, a Boston lawyer.' 7 The Guild was formed in
response to five complaints: (1) that players were the property of
the club that originally signed them under the reserve system; (2)
that players never received any of their sales price when sold to
another club; (3) that players were not compensated for the spring
13 Id. at 187-88.
14 The Baseball Players' Fraternity was organized by David L. Fultz, a former baseball
player and practicing attorney in New York. Id at 188-89.
15 Id. at 190.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 192.
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training season; (4) that player contracts could be cancelled by the
clubs on short notice but not by the players; and (5) that there was
no minimum salary in professional baseball. The Guild was little
more successful in realizing its goals than were its predecessors and
lasted less than one year.' 8
Thus, only since 1954, with the formation of the Major League
Baseball Players Association, has there been a union in professional
baseball with the power to survive. 19 And it is only since 1966, with
the election of Marvin Miller as director, that the Association has
been effective in negotiations.2 0 Since 1966, the battle cry of the
Association has centered on the reserve system,2 1 although conces-
sions, so far, have come only on other major issues.
18 Id. at 192-94; Krasnow & Levy, Unionization and Professional Sports, 51 GEo. L.J. 749,
762-64 (1963).
19 The growth of unionism and collective bargaining, which occurred in professional
baseball in the 1960's, was experienced in the other major professional team sports of
basketball, hockey, and football in varying degrees. The threat of a football players' strike in
1968 over pension fund provisions led club owners to contribute three million dollars to the
player pension fund. The players' association in basketball, led by Oscar Robertson and
attorney Lawrence Fleischer, hegan in the early 1960's by demanding that dubs increase
their contributions to the pension fund and that certain contract provisions, including the
option clause, which was similar to hasebalrs reserve system, be subject to bargaining. In
hockey, the present players' association was formed in 1967, and has achieved progress in
the areas of wages, pensions, and working conditions.
20 Interview with J. Gaherin. Marvin Miller brought to the labor relations scene in
professional baseball his years of experience with the Steelworkers Union.
21 The basis for the exemption of basehall's reserve system from the antitrust laws has
heen the subject of numerous congressional investigations. See generally Hearings on S. 950
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judidary, 89th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1965); Hearings on S. 2391 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Hearings on S. 3483 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960);
Hearings on S. 616 and S. 886 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm.
on theJudidary, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959); Hearings on H.R. 10378 and S. 4070 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958); Hearings on H.R. 5307 et aL Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957).
For scholarly analysis of the antitrust ramifications of the reserve system in professional
sports, see Allison, Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Status of the Reserve System, 25 BAY.
L. REv. 1 (1973); Foley, Antitrust and Professional Sport: Does Anyone Play by the Rules of the
Game?, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 403 (1973); Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective
Professional Sports, 58 YALE L.J. 691 (1949); Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of
Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L REv. 737 (1971); Note, Baseball Players and the Antitrust
Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 242 (1953); Note, Flood in the Land of Antitrust: Another Look at
Professional Athletics, the Antitrust Laws and the Labor Law Exemption, 7 IND. L. REv. 541 (1974);
Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of an Anachronism, 12 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 859 (1971); Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the
Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576 (1953).
In view of the fact that congressional investigations and judicial decisions have failed to
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II
RESOLUTION OF GRIEVANCE DISPUTES
A. Establishing a Procedure for Grievance Arbitration
The establishment of a negotiated grievance procedure in
professional baseball only dates back to 1968.22 Prior to that time,
grievance disputes were "resolved" when the player paid his fine or
sat out his period of suspension, in accordance with the dictates of
the club or the commissioner of baseball. The player's alternative
to discipline was to find a new way of earning a living.
Despite the Association's success in 1968 in negotiating a
grievance procedure, it was unable to win impartial arbitration as
the procedure's final step. Instead, the Association accepted the
commissioner of baseball as the arbitrator of all grievance dis-
putes. 23 It was clear, however, that the next round of negotiations
would focus on replacing the commissioner with an arbitrator who
would be more acceptable to the players. Richard M. Moss, counsel
for the Association, explained the players' dissatisfaction with the
commissioner as arbitrator in the following comment:
In baseball, as in football, the commissioner is, of course, an
employee of the club owners; he is hired by, paid, by, and can, at
will, be fired by the owners. He functions under very specific
instructions prescribed by the owners in the documents they
have agreed to among themselves relating to his office and
duties. He is the chief executive officer of the industry associa-
apply antitrust laws to professional baseball, and have failed to reduce the institutional
restrictions on the mobility of athletes even where the antitrust laws have been applied, some
observers have advocated increased governmental regulation of sports. In an address
delivered at the University of Denver, May 3I, 1974, the Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg
proposed the establishment of a National Regulatory Commission of sports to cover both
professional and amateur athletics.
22 Dennis & Somers, Arbitration of Interest Disputes, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING 108 (1973).
23 Id- at 109. Richard Moss, counsel for the Players' Association, explains:
As the cost of making that first basic agreement, which contained many valuable
improvements from our standpoint, we agreed upon the commissioner as the
grievance arbitrator for two years. We did so, quite frankly, because at that time
and place, there were severe limits to our bargaining power. It had been only a year
since the players had finally decided to reorganize their classic company union in an
effort to make it into an effective bargaining agent, and the whole idea was still
somewhat new. I don't know what, if any, issues would have been strike issues in
1968, but impartial arbitration dearly was not one of them. Other matters, as to
which we did make significant progress in the negotiations, were considered much
more important, for there was, even so recently, still a general lack of appreciation
of how basic the issue was. We rationalized our defeat by deciding we would process
grievances to arbitration, and we were confident that the record of that experience
would conclusively demonstrate the importance of impartiality.
Id. at 110.
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ion, and there's nothing wrong with that-it's a perfectly legiti-
mate and respectable role. But to provide, as did the players'
contracts prior to 1968, that he is also the exclusive judge of
disputes arising between the employers and their employees is very
much the same as an apartment lease stating that any dispute
between the landlord and the tenant will be resolved by the presi-
dent of the landlord's industry association, and for that distinct
privilege, the tenant will refrain from using any other avenue for
redress.
24
Ultimately, only two grievance disputes were heard by the "partial
arbitrator," Commissioner Eckert, who decided one for the player
and one for the owners.
2 5
Before another round of negotiations had commenced, a new
commissioner was hired by the owners to replace General Eckert.
The new commissioner was Bowie Kuhn, a lawyer who had rep-
resented the National League in the 1968 negotiations. 26 Since
there could be little doubt that the new commissioner would
appear unduly biased toward the owners, zz an impartial arbitrator
was substituted for~the remaining cases to be heard under the first
Basic Agreement.
28
24 Id. at 109-10.
25 Richard Moss has related his unusual, and somewhat amusing, experience with what
he describes as "partial" arbitration:
When I entered the hearing room, which was a conference room in the
commissioner's office, I was confronted by a battery of lawyers ou the other side of
the table. Now, as all of you who are advocates know, there is no more delightful
situation in an arbitration hearing than to be massively outmanned by opposing
counsel. You need not resort solely to your wits. You can rely on the sympathy of
the arbitrator, and on the confusion of the presentation that is sure to come in
rebuttal to yours. Moreover, you can attack the opposition individually, or collec-
tively, or in small groups, as it may suit your purpose at any particular time, and
you can usually encourage two or three of them to speak out simultaneously, to the
utter disgust of the arbitrator. But on that day it octurred to me that the usual
advantages may not be applicable when the arbitrator has the same employer as all
those lawyers.
• ' . Seated in the center was our arbitrator, the commissioner, who was then
General William Eckert. On his right was the commissioner's counsel, the distin-
guished Paul Porter of Washington ....
The hearing began when Mr. Porter handed the commissioner some notes on a
yellow legal pad, and the arbitrator read a statement concerning the identity of the
cases before him .... At that point I interrupted to voice an objection.... Using
my most sincere tones, I said, "It is you, General Eckert, who the parties, after long
and difficult negotiations, have selected to fill that role, and, therefore, I respect-
fully request that you ask all the others at the head table to excuse themselves."
There followed a short period of silence. Mr. Porter jotted down something on
his yellow pad and passed it to General Eckert, who read, "1 have considered your
argument and have decided that it is without merit-your motion is denied."
Id. at 110-12.
26 Id. at 112-13.
27 See note-84 and accompanying text infra.
28 Both sides now agree that David Cole served admirably as baseball's first impartial
arbitrator. Dennis & Somers, supra note 22, at 113. Interview with J. Gaherin.
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In 1969, baseball's system of self-government was subjected to
the scrutiny, and castigating comments, of the National Labor
Relations Board.2 9 Upon a petition filed under section 9(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act3" by an association of National
League umpires, the Board decided to assert jurisdiction over
professional baseball as an industry in or affecting com-
merce.3 1 Management had argued that the Board, as a matter of
policy, should refuse to assert jurisdiction pursuant to section 14(c)
of the Act.32 It was management's contention that because of
baseball's system of self-regulation, a labor dispute would be un-
likely to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. It was
also contended that application of the National Labor Relations Act
to professional baseball would be contrary to national labor policy,
29 American League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Association of National Baseball
League Umpires, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
30 Section 9(c)(1) provides:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations
as may be prescribed by the Board -
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor
organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of
employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their
employer declines to recognize their representative as the representative
defined in subsection (a) of this section, or (ii) assert that the individual or labor
organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their
employer-as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as
defined in subsection (a) of this section; or
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor
organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representa-
tive defined in subsection (a) of this section;
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe
that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an
appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer
or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with
respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a
question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall
certify the results thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
31 The Board's jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act is based upon the
commerce clause of the Constitution, and is coextensive with the reach of that clause. NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
In 1946, the American Baseball Guild petitioned the NLRB for an election, and was
refused on the ground that baseball was not "commerce." N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1946, at 25,
col. 3.
32 Section 14(c)(1) provides:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the
opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not
sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the
Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it
would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970) (emphasis in original).
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since Congress had already sanctioned baseball's system of self-
government.
33
In rejecting management's contentions, the Board supplied
the Association with additional ammunition for the upcoming 1970
negotiations. Finding that assertion of jurisdiction over profes-
sional baseball would best serve national labor policy, the Board
reasoned:
Baseball's system for internal self-regulation of disputes in-
volving umpires is made up of the Uniform Umpires Contract,
the Major League Agreement, and the Major League Rules,
which provide, among other things, for final resolution of dis-
putes through arbitration by the Commissioner. The system
appears to have been designed almost entirely by employers and
owners, and the final arbiter of internal disputes does not appear
to be a neutral third party freely chosen by both sides, but rather
an individual appointed solely by the member club owners them-
selves. We do not believe that such a system is likely either to
prevent labor disputes from arising in the future, or, having
once arisen, to resolve them in a manner susceptible or conduc-
tive to voluntary compliance by all parties involved. Moreover, it
is patently contrary to the letter and spirit of the Act for the
Board to defer its undoubted jurisdiction to decide unfair labor
practices to a disputes settlement system established unilaterally
by an employer or group of employers. 34
There could be no clearer message as to what should be discussed
in future negotiations, and after three months of bargaining,
culminating in the 1970 Basic Agreement, the owners' representa-
tives finally agreed to establish a tripartite arbitration panel, con-
sisting of two partisan arbitrators and a permanent impartial
chairman.
35
33 180 N.LR.B. at 191.
34 Id. (footnotes omitted).
35 Since 1970 John Gaherin has served as the management arbitrator and Marvin Miller
as the union arbitrator. The first permanent chairman was Lew Gill, who resigned in 1972.
The present impartial chairman is Peter Seitz. Interview with J. Gaherin.
Article X(A)(10) of the 1973 Basic Agreement provides in full:
"Arbitration Panel" shall mean the tripartite panel of arbitrators empowered to
decide Grievances appealed to arbitration. One arbitrator shall be appointed by the
Association, one arbitrator shall be appointed by the Clubs and the impartial
arbitrator, who shall serve as the Chairman of the Panel, shall be appointed by
agreement of the two Party arbitrators. In the event the Party arbitrators are unable
to agree upon the appointment of the impartial arbitrator, they jointly shall request
that the American Arbitration Association furnish them a list of prominent,
professional arbitrators. Upon receipt of said list, the Party arbitrators shall alter-
nate in striking names from the list until only one remains. The arbitrator whose
name remains shall be deemed appointed as the impartial arbitrator.
10571975]
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B. Professional Baseball's Experience with Impartial Grievance Arbitra-
tion
The significance of the establishment of the tripartite arbitration
panel should not be minimized. It involved an historic loosening of
management's control over the lives of players-control which had
been inherent in the commissioner system. Although the concept of a
tripartite arbitration panel is not unique to baseball, it is particularly
well-suited to the labor relations demands of the sport. Although an
impartial arbitrator might not be sufficiently sensitive to some of the
more subtle problems which could arise, he could benefit from the
partisan arguments framed by fellow panel members who may be
closer to the sport.36 Decisions of the arbitration panl are made by
majority vote or, with the agreement of the partisan arbitrators, by
the impartial arbitrator alone.
37
It would, of course, be unproductive for the partisan arbitrators
merely to reargue for their respective sides. But a degree of con-
tinuity may be fostered by the partisan arbitrators, at least until an
impartial chairman learns "the rules of the shop . ' 38 Theoretically, a
long-tenured impartial arbitrator might function well without such
partisan advice. By having partisan arbitrators on the panel, however,
both parties to the agreement can feel free to dismiss an unsatisfac-
tory impartial chairman without destroying the accumulated experi-
ence gained from prior cases.3 9 The presence of partisan arbitrators
can also provide the impartial chairman with an opportunity to test
his ideas before he must render a final decision. "As a practical
matter," observes one author, "the presence of partisan members on
an arbitration tribunal achieves much the same end as the equity
practice of submitting a master in chancery's report to the parties
before it is returned to the court. In both cases there is a desire to give
the parties a chance to react before a final decision is made.
'40
All disputes between a player and his employer are resolved in
accordance with the grievance procedure set forth in the Basic
Agreement between the Major League Clubs and the Major League
36 Interview with J. Gaherin.
37 Basic Agreement, art. X(A).
38 See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
39 Article X(A) of the Basic Agreement provides, in part:
At any time during the term of this Agreement either of the Party arbitrators may
terminate the appointment of the impartial arbitrator by serving written notice
upon him and the other Party arbitrator. Within 30 days thereafter, the Party
arbitrators shall either agree upon a successor impartial arbitrator or select a
successor from an American Arbitration Association list, as set forth above.
40 Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1245, 1268
(1963) (footnote omitted).
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Baseball Players Association, 41 effectiveJanuary 1, 1973.42 Under the
terms of the grievance procedure, however, not every dispute will
ultimately come before the tripartite panel. A complaint to the
commissioner, which concerns action taken with respect to a player or
players "involving the preservation of the integrity of, or the mainte-
nance of public confidence in, the game of baseball" will be heard by
the commissioner, and his decision will be final and binding.43 In
addition, complaints involving a fine or suspension imposed upon a
player by a league or by the commissioner "for conduct on the playing
field or in the ball park" are heard and decided by the league
president or the commissioner, and no further appeal is available.44
41 In professional baseball, all players must sign the Uniform Player's Contract, which
sets forth the terms of the employment relationship entered into by the individual players
when hired hy the club. Rule 9(a) of the Uniform Player's Contract provides:
The Club and the Player agree to accept, abide by and comply with all
provisions of the Major League Agreement, the Major League Rules, the Rules or
Regulations of the League of which the Club is a member, and the Professional
Baseball Rules, in effect on the date of this Uniform Player's Contract, which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this contract or the provisions of any
agreement between the Major League Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players
Association, provided that the Club, together with the other Clubs of the American
and National Leagues and the National Association, reserves the right to modify,
supplement or repeal any provision of said Agreement, Rules and/or Regulations in
a manner not inconsistent with this contract or the provisions of any then existing
agreement between the Major League Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players
Association.
42 However, disputes relating to the following agreements between the Players Associa-
tion and the dubs are specifically excepted from the grievance procedure:
(I) The Major League Baseball Players Benefit Plan.
(2) The Agreement Re Major League Baseball Players Benefit Plan.
(3) The Agreement regarding dues check-off.
Basic Agreement, art. X(A)(1)(a).
43 Id. art. X(A)(1)(b). This provision provides, in part:
Notwithstanding the definition of "Grievance" set forth in subparagraph (a)
above, "Grievance" shall not mean a complaint which involves action taken with
respect to a Player or Players by the Commissioner involving the preservation of the
integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of baseball.
Within 30 days of the date of the action taken, such complaint shall be presented to
the Commissioner who promptly shall conduct a hearing in accordance with the
Rules of Procedure attached hereto as Appendix A. The Commissioner shall
render a written decision as soon as practicable following the conclusion of such
hearing. The Commissioner's decision shall constitute full, final and complete
disposition of such complaint, and shall have the same effect as a Grievance
decision of the Arbitration Panel.
44 Id. art. X(C). This clause provides, in part:.
Complaints involving a fine or suspension imposed upon a Player by a League or by
the Commissioner for conduct on the playing field or in the ball park shall be
subject exclusively to this Section C, as follows:
I. Any Player who believes that he has ajustifiable complaint regarding such
discipline may, within 30 days of his receipt of written notification of the discipline,
appeal in writing to the League President if the discipline was imposed by him, or
to the Commissioner, if the discipline was imposed by him, for a hearing. Upon the
receipt of the notice of appeal, the League President or Commissioner, as the case
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These limitations upon the jurisdiction of the tripartite arbitration
panel are arguably not within the spirit of the National Labor
Relations Act, as they deprive employees of an impartial forum for
the resolution of work-related grievance disputes.4 5 It can be ex-
pected that upcoming negotiations will focus upon whether to re-
move these limitations on the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel.
46
With respect to those complaints which involve the integrity of,
or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of baseball,
the owners may have good reason for believing that the type of
forum for the resolution of such complaints could determine the
very survival of the sport as it is known today. In short, club
owners fear that an outside arbitrator might not deal with allega-
tions of illegal gambling in a manner consistent with the best
interests of the survival of the sport, and that another "Black Sox
Scandal" could destroy the public's confidence in professional
baseball. 47 A commissioner of baseball, in whose dedication to
preserve the integrity of the game the public can place its confi-
dence, is thought by the owners to be preferable to the arbitra-
tion panel as the final arbiter on such complaints. 48 But there is
may be, shall designate a time and place for hearing the appeal, which hearing shall
be commenced within 10 days from the date of receipt of the appeal. Such hearing
shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure attached hereto as
Appendix A. The League President or Commissioner, as the case may be, shall
render a written decision as soon as practicable following the conclusion of such
hearing, and may affirm, modify, or revoke the disciplinary action originally
imposed. The decision of the League President or Commissioner, as the case may
be, shall constitute full, final and complete disposition of the complaint and shall
have the same effect as a Grievance decision of the Arbitration Panel.
45 See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
46 Interview with J. Gaherin.
Professional baseball is not the only major sport confronted with the problem of expand-
ing the jurisdiction of impartial grievance arbitration. In professional football a major
controversy between the players and the clubs has concerned the extent to which issues,
which both sides accept as arbitrable, should be put to the commissioner, rather than to an
arbitrator. Football has agreed to the arbitration of injury grievances by an outside arbi-
trator, but all other grievances are ultimately settled by the commissioner. In the last
negotiations, the Football Players Association sought to enlarge the scope of outside
arbitration. The clubs made some proposals of modification but no agreement was reached.
Letter from Theodore W. Kheel, Labor Counsel to the Management Council of the National
Football League, New York, New York, to the Cornell Law Review, January 29, 1975. See also
Lowell, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Team Sport Industry, 38 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PtoB. 3, 18 (1973).
47 Interview with J. Gaherin.
When Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis became baseball's first commissioner, one of his
initial acts was to blacklist permanently eight players of the Chicago White Sox who were
allegedly involved in the "Black Sox scandal"-the "throwing" of the 1919 World Series to
Cincinnati. N.Y. Times, March 13, 1921, at 16, col. 1. One of his last acts as commissioner
was to remove a major league club owner for gambling on his club's games. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 24, 1943, at 24, col. 1.
48 Interview with J. Gaherin.
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little reason to believe that the general public would be reluctant to
place its confidence in the impartial chairman of the arbitration
panel. There is, however, one problem that would have to be
resolved before extending the panel's jurisdiction to such cases:
would the commissioner of baseball have the power and authority
to restrict the members of the arbitration panel from releasing to
the media information concerning allegations of illegal gambling?
Rather than enter this uncertain territory, with its constitutional
implications for freedom 'of speech and freedom of the press,
management is likely to continue the struggle to preserve this
domain for the commissioner.
49
With respect to complaints involving a fine or suspension
imposed upon a player by a league or by the commissioner for
conduct on the playing field or in the ball park, the club owners'
arguments for retaining these complaints for final determination
by the league president or the commissioner are unpersuasive.
From the players' point of view, it is a futile exercise to appeal the
imposition of a penalty to the very person who imposed that
penalty in the first place. It is politically impossible for a union to
settle for the judge's judging himself.50 Management's counter-
arguments, framed in terms of the need for discipline and effi-
ciency, fail to take account of the player dissatisfaction that forms
the nucleus of strong support for the union.
Consider this example suggested by management's representa-
tive. 51 A player becomes involved in an altercation with an umpire
and is ejected from the game. Umpires work for the league and, in
effect, represent the presence of the league president on the field.
Although the league president should be objective, he is likely to
fine or suspend the player in order to show support for the
umpire's right to exert his authority. To then have the penalty
removed to the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel, management
maintains, 52 would weaken the player's respect for the umpire and
cause the umpire to lose effective control of the game.
In an industrial setting, the foreman or supervisor must play
the role of "umpire" and attempt to resolve disputes prior to
arbitration. But that does not mean that superiors in the manage-
rial hierarchy are to have the sole authority to resolve the disputes.
The rationale underlying arbitration rejects this philosophy. Of







could be distinguished on the ground that it is the fans' confidence
in the authority of the umpires which must be preserved.
Nevertheless, it would be a sad commentary on the business of
professional sports to sacrifice a player's interest in due process to
the myth -that the umpire is always right.
Management's efficiency argument relates to the practicalities
of having such complaints submitted to arbitration. It is claimed
that monumental difficulties would arise in scheduling hearings at
locations and times convenient to both players and arbitrators.
53
The arbitrator's capacity to understand, on the basis of a dry
record, the emotion that led to the altercation has also been
questioned. 54 While one might speculate that an arbitrator, when
confronted with an identical record, would respond with no less
understanding than the commissioner, there is nevertheless room
for substantial improvement in this area. For example, video tapes
of games could be introduced into evidence. And to alleviate the
problem of scheduling, regional arbitrators could be used, as an
alternative to the tripartite panel, to assure that disputes are heard
at times and locations convenient to the parties. There is little
logical justification for retaining this domain for the two league
presidents or for the commissioner. But whether change will come
through negotiation, and the extent of the change, depends upon
the strength of the Association's commitment to this issue.
The cases which have been argued before the tripartite panel
have often been matters of first instance, involving basic issues
concerning the duties and obligations of the parties to each other.
Many of the cases are complex because not only the Basic Agree-
ment, but also the provisions of the Major League Rules and the
Uniform Player's Contract must be interpreted. In the words of the
counsel for the Association:
The Major League rules are a hodgepodge of semiliterate state-
ments on a variety of subjects, most of which have only the most
illusionary relevance to anything of consequence. They have
been developed by the owners' lawyers over a period of 40 to 50
years. For each rule which says something, there can usually be
found one which states quite the opposite, and it becomes a test
of the imagination of the advocates and the arbitrator to bring
order out of chaos. 55
One highly publicized grievance arbitration case, involving Charles
53 Id.
54 Id.
-5 Dennis & Somers, supra note 22, at 114-15.
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0. Finley and James A. ("Catfish") Hunter, tested the imagination
of all concerned.
56
Charles 0. Finley is general manager and part owner of the
Oakland Athletics. In January 1974, discussions began with his *star
pitcher James ("Catfish") Hunter as to the terms of Hunter's
contract for the upcoming year. Finley agreed to pay Hunter
$100,000 per year, for 1974 and 1975, with $50,000 of it deferred
so that Hunter would not have to pay the taxes on it until later
'years, when his tax obligations presumably would be reduced.
57
Months later, Finley refused to pay the deferred $50,000 for an
insurance annuity, as Hunter had directed. Finley realized that the
club, being the owner of the policy, would have to pay the taxes on
the annuity and would be denied the use of the deferred compen-
sation during the period of deferral.58
On October 4, 1974, Richard M. Moss, counsel to the Associa-
tion, wired Finley as follows:
"This wire being sent on behalf of James A. Hunter. Pursuant to
Paragraph 7(A) of contract between Hunter and the Oakland
Club, please be advised that contract is terminated due to default
in making payments in accordance with said contract and its [sic]
failure to remedy said default within 10 days after receiving
written notice thereof. Because of the impending playoffs and
World Series the effective date of termination shall be the day
following the last game played by the Oakland Athletics in
1974." 5
9
On October 17, the Association filed Grievance No. 74-48 with the
Player Relations Committee, requesting that the 24 major league
clubs be ordered to treat Hunter as a free agent, exempt from the
restrictions of the reserve system.60 On October 18, the Association
56 American and National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs (Oakland Athletics,
Division of Cb'arles 0. Finley & Co.) v. Major League Baseball Players Association (James
A. ("Catfish") Hunter), Decision No. 23 (1974) (Seitz, Impartial Chairman) (unpublished).
57 Id. at 1-2.
58 Id. at 11, 39.
59 Id. at 14.
Section 7(a) of the Uniform Player's Contract provides:
The Player may terminate this contract, upon written notice to the Club, if the
Club shall default in the payments to the Player provided for in paragraph 2 hereof
or shall fail to perform any other obligation agreed to be performed by the Club
hereunder and if the Club shall fail to remedy such default within ten (10) days
after the receipt by the Club of written notice of such default. The Player may also
terminate this contract as provided in subparagrapb (g)(4) of this paragraph 7.
60 American and National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League




filed Grievance No. 74-20 with Finley, requesting that the club pay
Hunter the deferred $50,000 plus damages.61
When the dispute arose, Hunter had an election of remedies.
He could have filed a grievance alleging a dispute regarding the
interpretation and application of the special covenant provision
relating to deferred compensation. In so doing, Hunter would
have framed his grievance as a resort to arbitration for the specific
enforcement of his contract, requesting that the arbitrator order
Finley to pay the $50,000 to the insurance company for the
annuity.6 2 Hunter elected, however, to invoke the rights granted in
the termination provisions of his Player's Contract,6 3 asserting that
Finley's actions nullified the contract.6 4 The character of Hunter's
complaint and the remedy he was seeking propelled the confronta-
tion beyond normal grievance disputes. Considering the record as a
whole, the impartial chairman sustained Hunter's grievance.
Hunter was declared a free agent and was awarded the deferred
amount for 1974 plus interest.
6 5
The immediate result of Hunter's case was a spectacular bid-
ding war;6 6 however, its long-term effect may be of greater im-
portance. As long as baseball retains its exemption from the
antitrust laws, players will look to the Hunter case for whatever
guidance it may offer in escaping the reserve system through a
contractual loophole. The financial magnitude of Hunter's agree-
ment with the Yankees will also be remembered by players in
future negotiations.6 7 There is little doubt that players will benefit
61 Id.
62 Id. at 20.
61 See note 59 supra.
6' American and National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, Decision No. 23, at 21 (1974) (Seitz, Impartial Chairman) (unpub-
lished).
65 Id. at 40.
" The Sporting News, Jan. 18, 1975, at 45, col. 1. The opening paragraph of the story
begins as follows:
The biggest auction in baseball history came to an end in a bizarre, unpre-
cedented and hastily called press conference on a snowy New Year's Eve when the
Yankees announced . . . that they had won the bidding war over 22 other teams
(only San Francisco did not bid) to gain the services of the former Oakland pitching
star, Jim (Catfish) Hunter.
The New York Yankees agreed to pay Hunter an estimated $2.85 million, including
salary-$150,000 per year for five years, attorneys' fees, insurance policies for Hunter and
his two children, and deferred bonus payments. Id.
67 An editorial in The Sporting News described the effect of the Hunter case on the
salary structure of baseball as follows:
Other star players must be looking at Hunter's pact with envy and with
determination to achieve the same kind of financial security. Their demands for
salaries and fringe benefits are certain to skyrocket. Every club in baseball will be
1064 [Vol. 60:1049
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from impartial grievance arbitration as long as baseball's establish-
ment and its fans are not enraged by the results. For better or for
worse, the potential impact of the Hunter proceeding will depend
upon the skills of the impartial chairman and his partisan advisors.
III
RESOLUTION OF SALARY DISPUTES
A. Establishing a Procedure for Salary Arbitration
Determination of player salaries has long been a thorny issue in
professional baseball. 68 In 1952, congressional hearings prompted
testimony from Baseball Commissioner A. B. Chandler that he
believed that players should have the right to secure arbitration of
salary disputes. 69 Many of the players who testified agreed with
Chandler, and the view was expressed that "a standardized method
of salary arbitration was desirable because of the inferior bargain-
ing position of the player who may negotiate with only one
employer. °70 But most club owners rejected the idea, preferring to
let a player stage a "hold-out" if he did not want to sign the
contract that was offered.7 1 Since a player was not free, under the
reserve system, 7 2 to negotiate with the team of his choice,7 3 the
affected as their players measure their value against Hunter. If Hunter as a pitcher
can command a king's ransom, what princely sums should go to other pitchers of
prominence? And how about the outstanding regular players who are in the lineup
every day? We look for sharp disagreements in contract negotiations this year and a
swarm of salary arbitration cases that could throw payrolls completely out of kilter.
The Sporting News, Jan. 18, 1975, at 14, col. 1.
68 In 1869, the Cincinnati Red Stockings became baseball's first salaried team. The
highest salary that year was less than $1,500. in 1871 "Cap" Anson was paid $66.66 a month
by the Rockford dub in the National Association, and his contract stipulated that he would
"conduct himself as a gentleman and abstain from profane language, scuffling and light
conduct." During the 1880's major league salaries ranged from $I,000 to $5,000 for a seven
month season. Although salaries gradually improved in the early 1900's, Christy Mathewson
never received more than $10,000 a season from the New York Giants. As late as 1922, the
entire payroll of the Boston Braves was only $80,000. P. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 93-94.
69 Hearings on Organized Baseball Before the Subcomm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of the
House Comm. n the Judiciary, 82d Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 1, pt. 6, at 298-99 (1951).
70 H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1952).
71 1951 Hearings, supra note 69, at 730-32. Branch Rickey, former general manager of
the Pittsburgh Pirates and the Brooklyn Dodgers, believed that arbitration of salaries would
be a complex task and predicted "that the ultimate end of such a system would be a
department which signed all professional baseball players." Id.
72 Rule 3(a) of the Major League Rules and Professional Baseball Rules, agreed to by all
professional baseball dubs, requires that each club contract with its players pursuant to the
Uniform Player's Contract prescribed by the Major League Executive Council, and specifies
that "[n]o club shall make a contract... containing a non-reserve clause." In addition, "[t]he
making of any agreement between a club and a player not embodied in the contract shall
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player's only alternative to accepting his club's final salary offer was
retirement, from baseball.
On October 18, 1969, Curtis C. Flood, then a major league
outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals, was traded to the Philadel-
phia Phillies, as part of a multiplayer transaction. At-the time of the
trade, Flood was a. twelve-year veteran with the Cardinals and
"acknowledged to be a player of exceptional and proven baseball
ability. '7 4 Flood was unwilling to play for Philadelphia, but could
not negotiate .with any other team due to the restrictions of the
reserve system. He therefore brought an action against the
twenty-four major league clubs, their league presidents, and the
baseball commissioner, seeking to have baseball's reserve system
declared unlawful.7 5 Flood was unsuccessful before both the lower
federal courts and the Supreme Court.7 6 But the case was
instrumental in paving the way toward a negotiated modification of
the reserve system by the introduction of salary arbitration.
77
Witnesses had testified as to the advantages and disadvantages of
salary arbitration as a modification of the existing reserve system.
s
subject both parties to discipline; and no such agreement, whether -written or verbal, shall be
recognized or enforced." Paragraph 10(a) of the Uniform Player's Contract provides that if
in the year of expiration of the contract a player and club do not reach agreement by a
certain date
the Club shall have the right by written notice to the Player at [his] address to renew
this contract for the period of one year on the same terms, except that the amount
payable to the Player shall be such as the Club shall fix in said notice.. . at a rate
not less than 80% of the rate stipulated for the next preceding year and at a rate
not less than 70% of the rate stipulated for the year immediately prior to the next
preceding year.
73 Rule 3(g) of the Major League and Professional Baseball Rules provides:
(g) TAMPERING. To preserve discipline and competition, and to prevent the
enticement of players, coaches, managers and umpires, there shall be no negotia-
tions or dealings respecting employment, either present or prospective, between
any plaer, coach or manager and any club other than the club with which he is
under contract or acceptance of terms, or by which he is reserved, or which has the
player on its Negotiation List, .. . unless the club or league with which he is
connected shall have, in writing, expressly authorized such negotiations or dealings
prior to their commencement.
74 Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
75 Id. at 272.
71 See note 7 supra.
71 The following modifications of and alternatives to the existing reserve system were
suggested by witnesses on behalf of Flood:
(a) independent competitive leagues; (b) limitation of club control over a player to a
fixed term of years; (c) permitting a player to become a free agent after an option
period; (d) trade veto for veteran players; (e) minimum salary progression; 0()
reduction in the number of reserved players; (g) salary arbitration.
Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 275 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
7' When asked on direct examination for his view of the feasibility of salary arbitration,
Charles S. Feeney, President of the National League, responded as follows:
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In the end, the judicial forum left it to the parties to determine
whether the reserve system Would be changed. 9
On February 8, 1973, baseball club owners, for the first time,
proposed that individual salary disputes with players be submitted
to arbitration. The owners proposed the granting of salary arbitra-
tion in exchange for relinquishment by the players of their de-
mand for a complete revision of the reserve system.8 0 The owners'
proposal contained a number of restrictions. Only a player with
three or more years of Major League.service would be permitted to
submit his salary dispute to arbitration, and no player would be
eligible for salary arbitration in two consecutive years. 8 ' The
criteria to be considered by an arbitrator would be the quality of
the player's contribution to his club during the past season, the
length and consistency of his career contribution, the record of the
player's past compensation, the existence of any physical or-mental
defects on the part of the player, and the recent performance
record of the club including its league standing and attendance.
8 2
This is a very difficult situation for any arbitrator because you can't judge a player
strictly by his batting average or his home run total. There are 16ts of things players
do to help win games that are not reflected in averages, and to see and know what
he does you must be there and observe it. I think the players and the people that
are negotiating with them at the present time are in a much better position to
negotiate and know exactly what they are negotiating about than an arbitrator. Also
I think you would end up having an arm's length situation between the players and
management with arbitration. I think that you would probably find yourself in a
situation where the player rated his services very much higher than he really
thought he was going to get and maybe management rated the services lower thfin
ieally felt because they knew arbitration was going to get into the picture.
I don't think it would be a good thing as far as relations between dubs and
players are concerned at all.
Appendix to Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, at 286-87, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)..
On the other side, one club owner, Bill Veeck, responded to the question as to whether
he thought salary arbitration would hurt or help baseball as follows:
I think that would be a splendid idea.... I think ... it would help. I think that it
would create a little better relationship. Just the right to have an arbitration, the
right not to be feeling that you are singly, as an athlete, negotiating against the.
wealth of a ball club, I think it would improve relationships. I think on many
occasions that the dub itself might profit a little bit, that on occasion ballplayers
have been somewhat unrealistic in their various demands. So I think it would be
beneficial from both ways.
Id. at 396-97.
79 "From the trial record and the sense of fair play demonstrated in the main by the
witnesses on both sides, we are convinced that the reserve clause can be fashioned so as to
find acceptance by player and club." Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
80 N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1973, at 17, col. 8. John Gaherin, who represented the dub
owners in the negotiations, commented: "We sincerely hope this offer proves to be the
instrument that brings us to agreement. This is the first proposal in the history of baseball in
which salary arbitration has been put on the table." Id. at 20, col. 6.
81 N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1973, at 33, col. 2.
82 Id. at col. 4.
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The arbitrator would not, however, be able to consider the follow-
ing: (1) the financial position of the player and the club; (2) press
reports, testimonials, or similar material bearing on the perform-
ance of the player or the club; (3) offers made by either player or
club prior to arbitration; (4) the cost to the parties of their rep-
resentatives or attorneys; (5) specific comparisons with other
players' salaries; or (6) salaries in other sports or occupations.83
The restrictive conditions became the immediate subject for
further negotiations. Both sides agreed on the concept of salary
arbitration, but negotiations dragged on as to the actual details of
implementation. Through the course of negotiations, the weak-
nesses of the commissioner system became apparent. In the N.Y.
Times, sports columnist Red Smith lamented:
Whatever gains are achieved, or damage done, in the cur-
rent contract dispute between the baseball players and the men
who own them, there has already been at least one result. Any
misconceptions about the role of the commissioner that may have
lingered in the minds of fans have been eliminated. On two or
three occasions since the haggling began, Bowie Kuhn has aban-
doned the pretense of neutrality and has issued press releases
presenting the owners' side to the public. No longer can there be
any illusion that the commissioner's office is a court of last appeal
or its occupant an impartial magistrate or a house dick riding
herd on the bosses to protect the players from exploitation. From
here out everyone must accept Kuhn for what he has been ever
since he was hired-his employers' mouthpiece, a front man, a
figurehead.
In 1968, when the owners replaced William D. Eckert
with their own lawyer, not one living soul confused the new
commissioner with the first commissioner, Kenesaw Mountain
Landis. From that day forward, everybody realized, the game
would be played the company way. That is why the players
fought for and won impartial arbitration of grievances, bypassing
the commissioner.
84
The players supported the Association, 85 and despite the interven-
tion of the commissioner on behalf of the owners,8 6 the final
agreement of February 25, 1973,87 was somewhat more favorable
to the players than was the owners' initial proposal. Under the
83 Id.
84 N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1973, at 27, col. 2.
85 N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1973, at 39, col. 2.
86 N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1973, at 31, col. 1.
87 N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1973, at 39, col. 2.
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terms of the agreement, "[a]ny Club, or any Player with both a total
of two years of Major League service and Major League service in
at least three different championship seasons, may submit the issue
of the Player's salary to final and binding arbitration. ' 88 The
prohibition against submitting salary disputes to arbitration in
consecutive years was eliminated.
89
The technique agreed to by the parties for salary arbitration is
both innovative and alluring, and has been described as "either/or"
or "high-low" arbitration.9 0 The player and the club each submit to
the arbitrator, and exchange with each other prior to the hearing,
single salary figures for the coming season (which need not be
figures offered during the prior negotiations). 91 The arbitrator is
"limited to awarding only one or the other of the two figures
submitted.192 The concept was discussed in the late 1940's and
1950's as an alternative to the national emergency dispute proce-
dures in the Taft-Hartley Act, but was not adopted.93 It was raised
again by President Nixon in a proposal for dealing with national
emergency disputes in the transportation area, as one weapon in
the arsenal of weapons that the President would have available to
forestall a strike. But the proposal was not accepted by Congress. 4
The technique, nevertheless, does seem well-suited for professional
sports when the sole issue to be resolved is an individual's salary,
and a failure to agree on terms expeditiously can have a deleteri-
ous effect on the entire team.9 5 Since the award is issued without a
written opinion,96 cases are decided quickly.
9 7
66 Basic Agreement, art. V(D)(1).
89 Interview with J. Gaherin.
90 Seitz, Footnotes to Baseball Salary Arbitration, 29 ARE. J. (n.s.) 98, 99 (1974); Letter from
C. C. Johnson Spink, President of The Sporting News to the Cornell Law Review, Feb. 11, 1975.
91 Basic Agreement, art. V(D)(3).
92 Id. art. V(D)(4).
93 Seitz, supra note 90, at 99.
94 Dennis & Somers, supra note 22, at 117. Arbitrator Arnold M. Zack has suggested
that a similar technique, but encompassing all issues in dispute, could meet the pressing
need in the public sector "for a procedure which will embody a viable substitute for the
threat of the strike, rather than a substitute for the strike itself." He calls this technique
"final offer selection." Zack, Final Offer Selection-Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 19 N.Y.L.F. 567,
572 (1974).
95 In professional hockey, an agreement has established the arbitration of salary
differences between NHL clubs and players for the seasons 1972-73, 1973-74, and 1974-75.
Under the terms of the agreement a permanent arbitrator has been selected to conduct
hearings and issue awards. The arbitrator's award is not limited to a selection between the
requests of owner or player. In arriving at his decision, the arbitrator must take into account
the following factors and assign to each of them the appropriate weight:
(a) the over-all performance of the player in the previous season or seasons;




B. Professional Baseball's Experience with Salary Arbitration
In order to agree upon the criteria to be used by an arbitrator
in resolving salary disputes, the parties had to overcome the
difficulty of measuring objectively a player's financial value to a
particular cluib. As one observer has remarked:
If baseball were simply a game, the value of a player would
be based entirely on his performance . . .; but baseball is also a
business, depending largely on gate receipts for revenue. Hence
those players are worth most who can attract the largest number
of customers to the ball park. A colorful personality, or even a
clown, can attract customers for a time, without high quality
performance, but in the long run the best performers are usually
also the best drawing cards.9 8
The parties agreed upon the criteria set forth in the owners'
proposal, 99 excluding from the arbitrator's consideration the club's
ability to pay. Whether an arbitrator should be permitted to con-
sider the financial position of the club and the players is now of
academic interest at best, but one may venture to guess that at least
one arbitrator involved with salary disputes is relieved that finan-
cial analysis is not part of his responsibility. Speaking of the torrent
of statistical data presented by both parties at the hearings where
he has presided, arbitrator Seitz has noted: "I had a feeling that I
had more figures before me than exist in the files of the Census
Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics."'100
The premise underlying the adoption of the "either/or" tech-
(c) the player's length of service in the league and/or with the dub;
(d) the over-all contribution of the player to the competitive success or failure
of the club in the previous season;
(e) special qualities of leadership or public appeal;
(f) the financial position of the dub shall not be taken into account in determin-
ing the player's compensation.
Owner-player Council, Minutes and Agreements, Section IV, Schedule A, revised to Jan. 1,
1973.
96 Basic Agreement, art. V(D)(4).
97 Article V(D)(4) of the Basic Agreement provides in part:
(4) Timetable and decision. Submission may be made at any time between
February 1 and February 10. In the event the offer of the Club is reduced on or
subsequent to February 10, the Player's right to submit to arbitration shall be
reinstated for a period of 7 days. Arbitration hearings shall be held as soon as
possible after submission, but, in any event, shall be scheduled to be held before
February 20. The decision shall be rendered by the arbitrator within 72 hours after
the hearing.
98 P. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 1. Gregory relates that when pitcher Rube Waddell was
in his prime, the gate-conscious owner of his club recorded each pitcher's performance and
also the size of the crowd that watched him. The owner, Connie Mack, noticed that "on days
Waddell pitched, attendance always ran a little higher." Id.
9 See notes 82-83 and accompanying text supra.
100 Seitz, supra note 90, at 100.
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nique for salary arbitration was that it would deter the parties from
bringing every salary dispute to an arbitrator for resolution, and
would consequently induce the parties to work out their differ-
ences through compromise. 10' Although it is too early to deter-
mine whether experience will prove the premise to have been correct
or mistaken, the technique does seem to motivate both the players
and the clubs to narrow their bargaining differences. Although
a number of salary cases have been withdrawn from arbitration
and settled by the parties without a hearing, 102 the majority, within
the past two years, have gone to arbitration.' 0 3 It may be that the
risk of having an arbitrator deliver an adverse award is not so great
as to discourage dependence upon the procedure. When the
"either/or" technique was raised in discussion with respect to na-
tional emergency disputes, and as the technique has been applied
more recently in the public sector, the entire package of demands
and offers was to be submitted to the arbitrator on an "either/or"
basis.' 0 4 Naturally, each side's list of demands, or offers, could
contain items of great, as well as limited importance. But neither
side could be certain how the arbitrator would decide, since he
could not trade items, but rather, had to adopt one package or the
other. In baseball, however, where the only issue in dispute is
salary, each party may reasonably believe that it has relatively little-
to fear, provided that its figure submitted to arbitration is not
completely unrealistic.
In addition to the statistics which are presented at the hearings, each arbitrator is given,
in advance of the hearings, the following joint exhibits:
(a) A copy of the Basic Agreement and the Memorandum Re Administration
of Salary Arbitration Procedure;
(b) A tabulation showing salaries for all players on Major League rosters for
the three previous seasons;
(c) The Baseball Register;
(d) A copy of the Official American League Averages for the season preceding
the arbitration; and
(e) A copy of the Official National League Averages for that same season.
Memorandum Re Administration of Salary Arbitration Procedure, supra note 5.
101 Letter from C. C. Johnson Spink, President of The Sporting News, -to the Cornell Law
Review, Feb. II, 1975.
'0' Id. In 1974, "25 players originally submitted their salary disputes to arbitration, only
to settle .. .before the hearings were held." N.Y. Times, March 3, 1974, § 5, at 2, col. 2.
'03 In 1974, the first year that salary arbitration was available, 29 players went to
arbitration. Thirteen players won their hearings; 16 lost. The Oakland Athletics, World
Series champions in 1972, 1973, and 1974, had nine players-more than any other
dub-submit their salary disputes to arbitration in 1974. Of the nine Athletics who filed for
arbitration in 1974, five won their cases. N.Y. Times, Feb. "9, 1975, § 5, at 5, col. 2. In 1975,
approximately 27 players requested arbitration, including 11 members of the Oakland
Athletics. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1975, at 53, col. 1.
1"4 See Zack, Final Offer Selection-Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 19 N.Y.L.F. 567 (1974).
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If the "either/or" technique does not deter dependence on
arbitration, the parties must face another question: is this good or
bad? The procedure could continue to work satisfactorily as a staff
of arbitrators who are knowledgeable about baseball develops. But
there may be a danger lurking behind the alluring mask of arbitra-
tion if the players and management lose respect for each other.
Good labor relations demand that arbitration not become a re-
placement for direct settlement. The proper role for arbitration is
one of last resort.
10 5
When used selectively to reach a resolution of salary disputes
where direct settlement has already failed, there is no cause for
alarm that arbitration will destroy the salary structure of baseball
or lead to a significant increase in the cost of tickets to the fans.
Sports salaries have soared in recent years, and the trend may
continue, but salary arbitration should not receive disproportionate
blame or credit for the general upward movement.'0 6 Salaries in
professional baseball, basketball, football, and hockey are not de-
termined in a competitive market because of the institutional
restrictions imposed by the leagues which prevent players from
negotiating with the teams of their choice. For every salary increase
that a baseball player receives as a result of salary arbitration, one
must consider how much more that player might have received if
he were free to negotiate with teams other than the one which
reserved him from the competitive forces of the marketplace.10 7
In fact, sports salaries in basketball and hockey have outpaced
gains in baseball in recent years because of the rival leagues which
have entered bidding wars for the services of professional basket-
ball and hockey players.' 08 In contrast to the lucrative, multiyear
105 Speaking of arbitration in the industrial context, Shulman has remarked:
The arbitration is an integral part of the system of self-government. And the system
is designed to aid management in its quest for efficiency, to assist union leadership
in its participation in the enterprise, and to secure justice for the employees. It is a
means of making collective bargaining work and thus preserving private enterprise
in a free government.
Shulman, supra note 2, at 1024.
106 N.Y. Times, March 11, 1973, § 5, at 4, col. 4.
107 The case of hockey player John McKenzie serves to illustrate the point that salary
arbitration does not produce competitive results. McKenzie's salary was arbitrated during
the 1971-72 season. The arbitrator settled on the $48,000 salary which McKenzie had
received the previous season. Yet McKenzie had been offered more than twice that salary by
teams which were excluded from negotiating for his services by the "reserve system."
GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 207 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
108 A study of athlete salaries by the staff of the Pay Board provides the following data:
Football: Salary range from $12,000 to $200,000 with an average of $28,000;
profits per team (average pre-tax estimate) of $900,000; average team payroll is
37% of the operating costs; less than 25% of players with multi-year contracts.
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contracts which have been signed by basketball and hockey players
who have chosen to jump leagues, the gains realized through salary
arbitration are relatively modest. Moreover, "since the price-setting
process [for tickets] in [professional] sports is not closely related to
player salaries," depending more on considerations such as radio
and television broadcast contracts, it is unlikely that increased
salaries realized by those players who win their arbitration cases
will have a significant adverse effect on the cost of tickets. 10 9
Rather, salary arbitration, just one step toward freedom from the
reserve system, protects the right of the sports fan to a stable
professional sports system-one that he can rely upon and enjoy.
CONCLUSION
Collective bargaining has brought benefits to professional
baseball players that they were unable to secure through legislation
or litigation. The establishment of a procedure for the resolution
of grievance disputes, which culminates in impartial arbitration,
has given baseball players much the same freedom from the
unilateral imposition of discipline that employees in other occupa-
tions have enjoyed for many years. Nevertheless, not all complaints
in professional baseball are within the jurisdiction of impartial
arbitration, as a result of continuing tension between the commis-
sioner system and the impartial arbitration system. Those com-
plaints that involve the preservation of the integrity of the game
are different from the routine grievances of an industrial employ-
ment relationship, and it is understandable that the commissioner of
baseball believes that he must have final and binding authority to
resolve such complaints. But complaints involving the penalization
of a player for conduct on the playing field or in the ball park are
Basketball: Salary range of $16,500 to $250,000 with the average salary
$50,000; average increase over last three years of 28%; average profits per team
unknown; team payroll is 35% of operating costs; incidence of multi-year contracts
unknown.
Baseball: Salary range of $13,500 to $160,000 with average player salary of
$28,500; average increase of 9.5% over past five years; profits per team (average
pre-tax estimate) of $2.5 million for "most successful teams" and $400,000 for "least
successful teams;" average team payroll is 30% of operating costs; incidence of
multi-year contracts is unknown. (The questionnaire was completed prior to Henry
Aaron's signing for $200,000.)
Hockey: Salary range of $12,000 to $120,000 with average of $32,000; average
increase over past three years of 15%; profits per team of $2.1 million; average
team payroll is 30-40% of operating costs; multi-year contracts held by 20-25% of
players.
Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1972).
109 GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 422 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
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not sufficiently distinguisbable from routine industrial grievances
to warrant their present exclusion from the jurisdiction of impar-
tial arbitration.
With the establishment of a procedure for impartial salary
arbitration, professional baseball has taken an innovative approach
to labor relations, which deserves the consideration of employers
and unions within the world of professional sports and in the
general employment community. Professional baseball illustrates
the flexibility of the labor arbitration process and demonstrates
that a system of private law can be designed to protect the interests
of those concerned with the improvement of the employment
relationship.
Mark L. Goldstein
